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Abstract
This study tests a hypothesis about the impact of foreign aid in Eritrea and whether it really 
achieved its intended goals. It further analyses foreign aid effectiveness and how it affects the 
policy of self-reliance in Eritrea. It attempts to investigate the way aid was channeled and the 
degree to which the country has had control of the process as well as setting the priorities 
which are closely related to “self-reliance”. The study seeks to answer the following 
questions: “Was aid delivered in a way that strengthened country ownership or undermined it?
Does it undermine the policy of “self-reliance”? And how can cooperation between Eritrean 
government and donors be adjusted in order to better enhance ownership and “self-reliance”
and overall aid effectiveness? The data for this study was collected mainly from the Ministry 
of National Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Eritrea-two 
Ministries Primarily dealing with International Cooperation. Both primary and secondary 
data sources were used. Interviews were also conducted with 5 key top ranking government 
officials. In this study, it is revealed that although the government of Eritrea negotiated very 
well and had a strong ownership in the process of aid delivery and setting priorities, the 
donor’s approach especially that of EU was ‘rigid’ in the eyes of the Eritrean government and 
created friction at times. The study further reveals that, Eritrea, although relatively less 
corrupt compared with many recipient countries, it showed lack of absorption capacity as 
well as weak institutions that made aid less effective in some areas. Eritrean government 
believes that its “self-reliance” policy was misunderstood as “isolationist” and created 
friction at times with donors.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND BACK-GROUND:
INTRODUCTION:
European Union has pledged a 200 Million Euros to Eritrea in aid in its November 2015 
meeting in Malta. The purpose of the aid is mainly to stop economic migrants by injecting 
money into development programs in Eritrea. What is important though is that this pledge is 
coming after years of Eritrean disengagement with donors, especially Western countries. 
Eritrean government has been rejecting foreign aid including from EU since 2005 with the 
belief that it contradicts the country’s policy of “self-reliance”. Now that the government is 
accepting aid, one would ask what changed or what is different about this aid? This research 
paper will try to answer these questions but also will take this opportunity to go back and 
assess why the government of Eritrea felt aid contradicts its policy of “self-reliance” in the 
first place. 
Eritrea is a relatively young country which got its independence in 1991 after a devastating 
thirty years of war. The war left its economic base totally shattered and very much dependent 
on development partners and aid agencies for its recovery and re-construction. Starting from 
the early years of independence, UN agencies like UNHCR and UNDP along with several 
local and international NGOs played a role in the process of resettling Eritrean refugees who 
were displaced or migrated to neighboring countries during the war and the re-integration of 
former combatants. Aid continued to make a large portion of the country’s GNI reaching up 
to 37% in 2003 making the country one of the highest aid dependent countries. [(OECD/DAC. 
(n.d.) Retrieved October 15, 2015, from http://www.aidflows.org]
Although there were some issues with international NGOs as early as 1997, from the year 
2005, the Eritrean Government started to be vocal against all foreign aid agencies and begun 
to be deeply suspicious of their intentions and the dangers of aid dependency. Consequently, 
the relationship between the governments and those agencies and NGOs began to sour. This 
same year, USAID and several NGOs were expelled, others chose to leave themselves 
(Connell, D., & Killion, T. (2011). Eritrea rejected more than $200 million worth of 
assistance in 2005 alone, this included food from the United Nations, loans from the World 
Bank and grants from multiple international contributions for the construction of roads and 
health care supplies (Edmund, S. (2007, October 1). 
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As a result of the shift in policy, the amount of aid given to Eritrea began to significantly 
dwindle after 2005. Eritrea, which was one of the highest aid dependent countries up to the 
early years of 2000 is now one of the least aid dependent DAC listed countries where aid 
only made 2.45% of its GNI in 2013 [(OECD/DAC. (n.d.). Retrieved October 15, 2015, from 
http://www.aidflows.org)]. All this was done in the name of “self-reliance” policy, as 
President of Eritrea Mr. Isaias Afewerki vowed not to lead another "spoon-fed" African 
country "enslaved" by donors [(2011, July 17). Eritrea advises African states to avoid famine 
through "self-reliance". BBC Monitoring International Reports]. The concept of “self-
reliance” is not an easy concept to define and understand, and at times it has been taken as 
“isolation” by its critics in the context of Eritrea. The Eritrean government insists that “self-
reliance” does not mean isolation and here is how it is defined in the Eritrean National charter:
The basic principles of “self-reliance” politically means following an independent line and giving
importance to domestic realities. Economically, it means relying on internal capabilities and 
developing one’s own capacities. Culturally, it means to “have self-confidence and develop one's own 
cultural heritage”. “Self-reliance”, according to Eritrean national Charter, does not mean isolating 
Eritrea from the rest of the world. “It only means being as, independent and self-confident a player as 
possible in the international community” (Markakis, 1995).
The “self-reliance” program began in 1994 but speeded up in 2005 with a small inadequate
budget and the mobilization of the country's youth in a national service campaign dabbed 
‘Warsay-Yikealo’ development campaign. An independent assessment of the campaign is yet 
to be produced and therefore, it is difficult to gauge its results. However, the policy has 
attracted harsh criticism. Its critics argue that it can cost the country a big deal. They see it as 
“isolationist” stance by the government which can worsen the country’s economic and 
humanitarian situation. One of such critics is a BBC correspondent Ed Harris reporting from 
Eritrea in 2006, who said “Self-Reliance could cost Eritrea dear.” The economist also 
released an article titled “A myth of self-reliance” on April, 2006 criticizing the decision as 
costly. 
Against this background, this research paper aims at assessing the foreign aid given to Eritrea 
since its official independence in 1993 up to 2005 and then will see what happened after 2005. 
The research will analyze why the Eritrean government perceives foreign aid as ineffective 
and contrary to self-reliance. The issue of ‘country ownership’, one of the main pillars of the 
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Paris Principles on aid effectiveness, and which was re-emphasized in “Busan Partnership for 
Effective Development Cooperation” in 2011, will be the central issue of the study. Aid is 
believed to be sustainable and effective when the recipient country has a full ownership of the 
program. On the other hand, the absence of true and real ownership on the part of recipients 
is said to be one of the main reasons why aid has not been delivering the desired results. So, 
this paper will look into this issue in the case of Eritrea.
1.1. Country Profile:
Eritrea is a country located on the East African side of the Red Sea. Eritrea is bordered with 
Ethiopia from the South, Sudan from its Northwest border, and Djibouti from the Southeast. 
Eritrea, with a population of more than five million, achieved its independence from Ethiopia 
following after 30 years of bloody armed struggle in 1991 but had to wait for international 
recognition until 1993. 
Eritrea’s economy is largely based on subsistence agriculture, with 80% of the population
reliant on it (CIA world fact book January 20, 2018). GDP (PPP) for the year 2017 stood at 
$9.631 billion with a per capita estimate of $1,600 (World Bank, 2018).
Eritrea is the LDCs, which is actively struggling to realize the mission of “nation building” 
and socio economic improvement. As clearly articulated in the Macro-Policy Paper of 1994, 
in the National Economic Policy Framework and Program of 1998, and in the Transitional 
Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategic paper of 2001, the Government of the 
State of Eritrea’s (GoSE) prime national development goal is the formation of a modern and
technologically innovative and globally viable economy (Habtom, (2016) :200). The GoSE 
endeavors to achieve a sustainable economic growth with due emphasis on social justice
indicators like affordable education, improved health, adequate food and equitable access to 
services. The GoSE strongly believes that development cannot be achieved by depending on 
aid but rather through investments and trade from developed partner countries (Ibid).
Despite these ambitious visions and policies, Eritrea has been facing various economic 
obstacles, including lack of financial resources and continuing drought. Similar to the 
economies of most African countries, a big percentage of the population - nearly 80% is 
engaged in subsistence farming, but the sector only produces a small percentage of the 
country's total output- accounting only 11.7% in 2017. Mining has accounted for the biggest
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share of the country’s production in the past few years (CIA world fact book 2019). Even 
without droughts, Eritrea's harvests normally cannot adequately supply the food gap of the 
country without additional grain purchases. 
Minerals such as gold, potash and copper mining are likely to carry the economy to a narrow
growth and will be the main sources of government revenue for the next few years. (CIA,
2019).
1.2. Definition and Theoretical Frame Work:
The phrase “foreign aid,” in this paper, refers to Official Development Assistance (ODA) and
is defined as “the flow of official financing to the developing world that is concessional in 
nature, namely grants and loans with at least a 25 percent grant component” according to the 
definition of Development Assistance Committee (DAC)(www.oecd.org/dac).
ODA is generally given for the purpose of encouraging economic growth and prosperity of 
developing countries, and involves bilateral assistance directly from donors to recipients and 
multilateral aid that is directed through third party institution like the World Bank and IMF. 
Pro-aid economists have long argued and regarded foreign assistance as an instrument for 
tackling the investments gap in developing economies. This is based on the theory that the 
Third World is poor because it does not have the capital required for accumulating income-
generating investments. Most mainstream economics literature recommends that aid can help 
developing countries by bridging this “financing gap”. The “big push” model views aid as 
indispensable input for investment that would, in turn, lead to growth and jump-start
countries to economic development (United Nations 2006). 
On the other hand, the “big Push” is said to be effective only when countries have strong 
institutions. That is the reason an increasing number of scholars are calling for “greater 
selectivity” in giving assistance to poor countries, because empirical evidence seem to lead to 
the conclusion that the “big push” can only have a positive impact in countries that have 
made commendable advancement in improving their procedures and institutional capacities. 
World Bank estimations forecasts that “a $10 billion increase in foreign aid flows would lift 
about 25 million people a year out of poverty if lending was given to countries with strong
economic institutions” (International Journal of African and Asian Studies 2016). The number
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drops to only 7 million people if lending is unselective on the basis of governance quality
(Ibid).
In a stark contrast to the above notion, many of the literature argue that aid does not help 
elevate countries out of poverty, or even worse, it cripples societies by creating “dependency”
and even the very motives behind it is questioned. One such a skeptic of foreign aid has been
the Government of Eritrea. This research will put this controversial issue to test in the case of 
Eritrea and see if the Eritrean government’s views on aid have been justified by investigating 
the aid flows to the country, its modalities and how they affected the country’s mantra of 
“self-reliance”.  
1.3. Related Literature:
Despite a constant rise in the amount of foreign assistance given to recipient countries in 
recent years, the issue of whether it has served the purpose or not has created a heated debate 
among the leading scholars of the field. Many scholars argue that it failed to deliver the 
benefit it intended to, or even worse, it made some of the recipients worse off. On the other 
hand, proponents of aid say aid itself has not been the problem but rather combination of 
other factors have negatively affected aid effectiveness and they call for more but “wiser” aid. 
This paper will assess some of the leading experts’ literature from both sides of the argument. 
Aid Creates Dependency:
Based on firsthand experience of her own country (Zambia), Moyo (2009), argues that aid 
does more damage than good to Sub-Saharan Africa. Moyo says that African governments 
see foreign aid as a constant, reliable, and dependable source of revenue and therefore, they 
are not motivated to find alternative sources of income domestically. She argues that they are 
not forced to set a long term financial plan and therefore render themselves dependent on 
external assistance. 
The prominent dependency theorist widely considered as the founder of dependency theory, 
Andre Gunder Frank (1979) describes official aid as a form of “neo-colonialism”. Frank is 
especially critical of the loans provided by the World Bank, IMF and other international 
money lending institutions to the third world countries. He argues that these loans involve 
interest and they are invested in economies like irrigation, dams or other infrastructure which 
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have slow recovery or might totally fail to recover the cost. Meanwhile, the interest 
accumulates and becomes more than the initial loan.
Hayter (1971) argues that external debt owed to donor countries leads to dependency for the 
beneficiary governments. In the case of tied aid, recipient governments may find themselves 
compelled into accepting multi-national Companies investment, into making internal political 
changes as well as ensure those recipient countries support for donor strategic interests 
instead of their own goals and interests. Hyter gives an example of Kenya being rewarded 
with assistance for allowing US forces to use its port facilities during the Gulf War. (Hayter, 
1971)
Similar to Moyo’s argument, Ranis, (2007) believes that in the recipient countries, aid has 
often caused a significant drop in local taxes which is supposed to be the most reliable 
sources of earnings for any government. Renis also argues that private savings are reduced 
due to dependence on foreign assistance because beneficiaries tend to see bank on it on rainy 
days. This phenomenon is most evident in Sub-Saharan Africa where aid has been as big as 
13 percent of GDP on average (Renis, 2007).
Moyo (2009), and Renis (2007) both argue that foreign aid chokes off private investment and 
takes the pressure off reforms for governments; it encourages rent seeking behavior and also 
aids corruption. Moyo is of the opinion that aid to Sub-Saharan Africa should phase out and 
ultimately stopped saying “aid is endemic. The more it infiltrates, the more it erodes, the 
greater the culture of aid-dependency” (Moyo, 2009. P.37). 
Quite often, proponents of aid point to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to show 
that aid is essential because infant mortality as well as other health conditions have shown 
progress in some countries. Hyter (1971) though, argues that aid in fact contributes to high 
infant-mortality rates and low life-expectancy, again because of debt which compels the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) to service it instead of investing to improve their citizens’ 
health. Hyter’s book was written long before the MDGs were proposed in 2000, and therefore 
what she said about worsening of infant mortality may not be true now as most countries 
showed admirable progress in improving infant mortality in recent years.    
Frank (1979) provides a detailed statistical data on debt owed to the aid donors. He says that 
substantial amount of some of the LDCs’ national earnings went to the creditors as debt 
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repayments throughout 1970s. Frank points out that Mozambique and Ethiopia, two of the 
LDCs, spent half their export earnings servicing debt. By Frank’s calculation, the capital that 
was flowing out of the recipient countries was more than what was coming in. Frank argues 
that the result of foreign “assistance” to the LDCs is “not development, but the development 
of underdevelopment”. (Frank, 1979) 
Frank is rather pessimistic about the future of the relationship between the developed and the 
developing countries. He argues that the poor countries are trapped into a system they cannot 
unlock. As a solution, he calls for the LDCs to isolate themselves from the West. He 
mentioned countries like Iran who went through a socialist revolution to topple the 
governments that cooperated with the West and are now isolated from the rest of the world. 
Renis (2007) believes that aid failed to deliver the desired results because of bad institutions 
and lack of accountability on the side of recipient countries. He proposes a less dramatic 
solution by saying that aid can be made more effective by placing some pre-conditions and 
rewarding those who fulfill these pre-conditions. Renis believes that the ‘Millennium 
Challenge Account (MCA)’ proposed by former president of the USA George W. Bush 
administration would bring some results. He says this would give the recipient governments 
to design their own programs and have ownership on aid. Moyo (2009) on the other hand, 
believes that conditionality carries little punch and argues it is not a solution because it is not 
taken seriously by both the donors and the recipients. She instead prefers aid to stop and 
replaced by Foreign Direct Investment and Trade.    
Celasun, Walliser, Tavares, and Guiso (2008) believe unpredictability of aid to be one of the 
reasons why aid is not delivering the intended results. They say that the actual aid disbursed 
is less than what is committed resulting in acute spending constraints and change of plans to 
the most aid dependent countries. Even when unexpected additional aid is disbursed, the 
recipient country is forced to adjust and make changes in a short time (Celasun, Walliser, 
Tavares, & Guiso, 2008)   
Celasun et, al. (2008) propose that countries rely on domestic sources of income to overcome 
aid related shocks and do away with aid dependency as it is more predictable. They advise 
countries to borrow from domestic sources to finance their budget, but they admit this too 
could have limitations as domestic markets in these poor countries are weak. 
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What the literature on foreign aid opponents show is that there is a consensus that aid failed 
to deliver results in the past several decades, but there is no consensus on the reasons why it 
failed. The solutions proposed by each expert is also different based on the reasons of failure.   
Aid helps and should continue to be given: 
Columbia University professor Jeffery D. Sachs is one of the most prominent supporters of 
foreign aid. In his book End of Poverty (2005), Sachs calls for the increase of aid given to the 
LDCs. Sachs argues that ‘Big Push’ model of economics can work if the developing countries 
get enough amount of aid from donors to enable them to get their feet on the ladder of 
economic take off. He argues that once they reach that level, their economy can sustain itself 
and they would not need to rely on foreign assistance any longer. “If a country is trapped 
below the ladder, with the first rung too high off the ground, the climb does not even get 
started” Claims Sachs (2005, p. 73). 
Bill Gates, the biggest individual contributor to philanthropies and NGOs, believes that aid 
has contributed a lot in improving lives in many countries. Gates says that from the 1960s to 
2010, many countries have seen a remarkable improvement in the health sector as well 
increase in income and argues that aid contributed a big deal to that progress. Gates disagrees 
with the idea that aid does not work and says it is a “myth” (B. Gates, personal 
communication, n.d).   
Jeffery Sachs emphasizes the importance of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a 
“path to fairness and a path to prosperity.” He believes that extreme poverty can be done 
away with just for below 1 percent of the rich countries’ income Sachs rather optimistic and 
believes that poverty can be eliminated by 2030 if there is genuine commitment readiness to 
do so by the rich countries (J. Sachs, personal communication, n.d).
Collier, P. (2007), in his book, the bottom billion, believes that in the absence of private 
capital, aid can play a big role in helping the one billion people in 60 low income countries 
that are left out of prosperity so that they can narrow the development gap with the developed
world with a strategically designed and targeted aid. Collier thinks besides making sure these 
countries have a stable security, good governance and favorable trade policies, aid is the other 
way we the rich countries could help them (Collier (2007). He argues against those aid 
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opponents who believe that these countries should generate resources from domestic sources 
because Collier says these countries have to cut deep into their consumption to that but he 
notes that they are already living on the margins so it may exacerbate their condition farther. 
1.4. Thesis Statement:
Eritrea government significantly scaled down or in some cases, stopped receiving foreign aid 
since 2005 believing it undermines the country’s policy of “self-reliance” and that it breeds 
culture of dependency. However, no detailed explanation has been provided by the Eritrean 
government to support the claim. This necessitates a deeper study into the way aid was 
channeled to Eritrea and the degree to which the country has had ownership on the issue of
aid delivery which is closely related to self-reliance.  
1.5. Statement of a Problem:
Although, in principle, Eritrea is not against international assistance, the government was not 
content with the delivery mode and the motive behind some donors. Consequently, it has 
refused to accept foreign aid since 2005 and has been suspicious of the activities of aid 
agencies thus limiting and restricting them from fully functioning in the country, or in some 
cases forcing them out. This has brought the country into conflict with many donors and it 
went beyond just the issue of aid to the extent of severing Eritrea’s diplomatic relations with 
most of its former development partners. 
1.6. Research Questions
This research will answer two main questions:
1. Was aid delivered in a way that strengthened or undermined country ownership and 
“self-reliance”?
- Before 2005?
- After 2005?
2. How can cooperation between the Eritrean government and donors be attuned in a 
way that can enhance ownership and “self-reliance” for Eritrea?
1.7. Hypothesis:
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Despite officially claiming foreign aid has not helped the country, Eritrea has witnessed some 
admirable achievements in some sectors where aid was allocated. Aid delivery and 
development cooperation approach did not seriously undermine Eritrea’s “self-reliance”. 
Nevertheless, steps could be taken by both government and donors to further enhance 
“country ownership” and encourage “self-reliance” of Eritrea.
1.8. Objective:
The objectives of the research are:
 To take a closer look at the aid policies and procedures of Eritrea’s donors and find 
ways whereby these polices can best fit into the policy of “Self-reliance” of the 
country.
 To try to separate political decision from technical aid problems so that the Eritrean 
government as well as donors can, objectively asses and revise their policies based on 
purely aid effectiveness metrics.
 To put forward some recommendations for a better cooperation between Eritrea and 
donor countries in the future based on the findings of the research.
1.9. Research Methodology:
 Time frame:
The study will stretch from 1993 (Eritrean official Independence) up to present with the year 
2005 as a reference year because it was a turning point in issues related to aid to Eritrea and it 
was the year where regulations governing NGOs was released pushing most of them out of 
Eritrea.
 Data: 
For a deeper and extensive analysis, the research will be conducted based on both primary 
and secondary data. The researcher will collect primary data by interviewing and distributing 
questionnaires to key informants from the Government of Eritrea (mainly depending for 
qualitative data) as well as dig into official documents on the subject. For the donor side of
the story, official documents will be referred. Collection of secondary data will be based on 
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various books, articles, magazines, electronic readings and websites.
 Limitations:
This research will only analyze the issue of country ownership in the Eritrean case and 
therefore is limited in its scope as it will only see at a part of what makes aid effective. The 
research will also only assess the Official Development Assistance (ODA) from the OECD 
countries (with the exception of Japan) because it is with these set of countries that Eritrea 
had a rocky relations over the years. The data for this research is qualitative and nature and is 
less suitable for empirical analysis.   
 Country ownership metrics:
There are multiple ways and metrics where by aid effectiveness is measured. One such 
metrics was developed in 2005 in the Paris Declaration of aid effectiveness. Most of the 
elements of Paris Declaration were re-emphasized in 2011 in Bussan, South Korea. For this 
purpose, the following metrics will be studied as measurements of country ownership in the 
case of the State of Eritrea.
Ownership of Priorities: this will assess Donor Adaptability to Country Needs, and Donor 
Alignment with Country Development Strategies. 
Ownership of Implementation: will see if Local Procurements and Local Systems have 
been used over the years. 
Ownership of Resources: Domestic Resource Mobilization and Local Co-Financing as well 
as integration of External and Local Funding to Increase Sustainability will be looked at here. 
Policy conditionality: The number and degree of enforcement of policy conditions will be 
analyzed. 
1.10. Structure of Thesis:
This paper will be divided into six sections. The first section will consist of an introduction, 
literature review, structure, and objective of the paper. Second section will give an overview 
of the historical back-ground of “self-reliance in Eritrea”, focusing on its origins and how it 
affects Eritrea’s policy on foreign assistance. Section three will focus on Overview of Aid 
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Flows from 1993-2005 assessing the modalities of some donors and how these modalities fit 
into the Eritrean policy. The fourth section will be devoted to post 2005 aid disbursements 
with a focus on why or how it was different from the previous aid disbursement mechanisms.
The fifth section will discuss the results and make some analysis on the findings. The 
research will wrap up with conclusion of the main ideas as well as some recommendations of 
the researcher in section six. 
CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACK-GROUND OF “SELF-RELIANCE” IN ERITREA:
“Self-reliance” is indeed a doctrine of the Government of the State of Eritrea and is a very 
popular concept in the country. But it is also a controversial issue for it was taken to mean 
“isolationist” and an “empty slogan” by Western donors. The idea of “self-reliance” in the 
Eritrean context first appeared during the country’s liberation struggle (1961-1991) not for 
political reasons but out of need. 
Eritrean liberation struggle can be considered quite unique considering it had no support from 
neither of the cold war camps. Having little else than human resource, it had achieved so 
much and won over a big “enemy” that was supported by super powers at the time. Mr. 
Samsom Berhane, director of international cooperation in the Ministry of National Planning 
and Development interprets the idea of “self-reliance” as something that carries a strong 
willpower to be in control of “structural and social developments” and rely on one’s human 
and natural capital. Mr. Berhane adds that it also means being in control of one’s own matters, 
goals and decision. For the most part, this issue has been “controversial” at best as it was 
interpreted as ‘isolation” and that it was unrealistic. The fact that the Eritrean liberation 
struggle was on its own for 30 years, has developed a deep sense of “self-reliance” but at the 
same time, it seems that it developed a sense of skepticism towards the international 
community.
Eritrean government claims that it welcomes it whenever development assistance is required;
however, compromising ownership of the program is not an option. Consequently Eritrea is
in control of the managerial role of the projects in the county while benefiting from the 
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monitoring capacity of donors. Eritrea does not approve of the “donor-recipient” relations and 
thus gives so much emphasis to “partnership”. Mr. Yemane Ghebreab, Senior Political 
advisor to the President of Eritrea sums this notion as follows in an a live interview he 
conducted with ‘EritreaLive’; 
“We believe that the donor-recipient paradigm has failed and is outmoded. Cooperation can 
only work if there are mutual interests. That’s why we focus on trade and investment and not on 
hand-outs which create dependency. Today Europe needs Africa, probably as much as Africa 
needs Europe. Unfortunately old habits persist and many European countries seem to live in the 
past”
(Dolce, 2013).
The GoSE development strategy emphasizes the creation of human capital, expansion of the 
infrastructure, and formulating environmentally conscious policies (GoSE, 1994, 1998). 
Eritrea’s development priorities are well elaborated in its human resources, infrastructure and 
food security programs and policy statements (AfDB, 2012). The government gives much 
attention to “self-reliance” to the extent “not seen elsewhere in Africa” (Ibid). The GoSE 
argues that economic growth and development should not be founded on aid but rather on 
trade and investment from the economically advanced countries.
The government believes that ultimately, alleviating poverty depends in enhancing the skills 
of the citizens by way of education and training, and in creating jobs and income creating
opportunities. The Eritrean development vision emphasizes empowerment of the people; in 
the belief that only if citizens have ownership will they reap the fruits of development. 
2.1. Aid Policy of Eritrea: A Dream for “Quick Graduation”:
Eritrea’s admission into the aid world was described as a rare “expression of national 
ownership and sovereignty” (Anneke et al.2008). In 1994, the Eritrean government
articulated a plan guiding the country’s international cooperation, emphasizing “long-term”
relationships founded on a “partnership”, where the donors would work as “catalysts” with 
financial and technical support but not take the country’s development process in their hands
(Ibid).
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According to a Swedish country study of 1996, Eritrea was able to tell between “interference 
and influence”. The study witnessed that Eritrea said ‘no’ to donors who don’t fit into its 
models and priorities (Ibid). In short, Eritrea a clear vision for moving from dependency on 
grants to economic cooperation by means of loans and investments since 1994. This policy 
remains the same to date.
The GoSE is convinced that aid cannot be a remedy to all development bottlenecks in the 
LDCs. And the government argues that aid affects the beneficiary in a number of ways: firstly, 
the overdependence on aid renders these countries weak while bargaining aid (Ibid). The 
donors are believed to put forward a number of conditionality for supplying aid. The other 
problem is that donors get the chance to interfere in the recipient country’s domestic affairs 
like in the fiscal, monetary and development policies (Ibid). Finally, aid is said to burden 
recipient countries with debt and debt servicing situations. 
2.1.1. Setting Priorities:
Eritrean government is well aware of the pitfalls of the above mentioned problems. As a 
result, the Eritrean insists on full responsibility for the development of sector policies,
strategies, as well as program operation. Presence of long-term expatriate technical 
professionals is frowned upon. The ultimate goal of Eritrea, within a timeframe not more than
10 years, was to transfer from dependency on grants to typical economic cooperation that
included trade and investment. In 1998, Eritrea voiced concerns over aid dependency and 
demanded that grants give way to loan facilities. The government also requested decrease in
foreign consultancies and replace equipment and supplies at their expenses (Ibid).
The Eritrean leadership, having learned the hard way during the long years of war   
independence, was less than unconvinced that, aid with strings attached to it, was actually the
solution for the country’s difficulties.  The Eritrean government saw aid as provisional funds
for “self-reliance”. Highlighting the critical importance of mutual foreign cooperation, many 
government officials in Eritrea stated that Eritrea needed people to work with her not to work 
for her. 
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The former late Minister of Health Mr. Saleh Meki, for example believes that, all projects be 
“nationally oriented” (Habtom, 2016). Mr. Meki insists on the country setting its own 
priorities and that foreign assistance be only complementary to the country’s broader
development strategy. With that policy framework, international and national NGOs were
welcome to take part in the public health programs according to Mr. Meki (Ibid). Aid is 
believed be more effective when it is aligned with development strategies of recipient 
countries. Today’s  aid  allocations modalities need change, and aid agencies  in charge of 
the flows of financial and technical assistance-need to work  in cooperation  with  policy 
tools  of  other  agencies  to  ensure long term benefits.
In the last two decades the government has been regulating aid activities through different 
mechanisms; the table below outlines the steps taken to limit the activities of NGOs in Eritrea.
Table 1. Proclamations restricting NGOs in Eritrea:
Time line Restrictions on NGOs Consequences
1995 restricted local and foreign religious 
relief activities with proclamation no. 
37/1995
_____
1996 Food aid replaced by monetization 
program.
____
1997 NGO’s ordered to limit their activity 
on health and education sectors
Several NGO left
1998 government decided to graduate from 
humanitarian assistance and asked 
NGO’s to phase-out their program
Many remaining NGOs left the 
country
1998-2000 relaxed its policies because of border 
war with Ethiopia
Humanitarian assistance was 
provided for war displaced 
people. 
2005 regulated NGOs activities in the 
country through proclamation 
145/2005
only few financially established 
NGOs managed to stay in the 
country
Source; (GOE, 1995; EC, 2009), (GOE, 2005)
In May 2005, the government published a Proclamation barring NGOs, both domestic and 
foreign, from getting funding for “relief” or “rehabilitation” purposes from the United 
Nations, or other organizations, or with bilateral agreement (A Proclamation 145/2005, 
2005).
The Proclamation defines an NGO as “an organization that engages in relief and/or 
rehabilitation work” (Ibid). Furthermore, the proclamation only allowed NGOs to work if 
they have “at their disposal in Eritrea one million US Dollars or its equivalent in other 
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convertible currency” (Id. at art. 8(1)(c).). Within ten months from the Proclamation in May 
2005 and March 2006, the number of NGOs operating in the country dropped from 37 to 13.
Due to absence of funding, the number of NGO operating has further diminished, and the U.S. 
Department of State reported that only 11 NGOs were operational in the years 2006 and 2007.
(UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2006)
The Director of ‘International Cooperation’ at the Ministry of National Planning and 
Development Mr. Samsom Berhane, summarizes Eritrean fundamental principles of 
international cooperation policy as follow: one, respect of mutual sovereignty and values; 
second, genuine cooperation that neglects the donor-recipient nature of the partnership; third, 
prioritize trade and investment than development assistance; fourth, political and economic 
conditionality free cooperation; and finally avoidance of third parties or intermediaries in the 
development cooperation (such as NGOs and International Organization).
CHAPTERN THREE
OVERVIEW OF AID FLOWS FROM 1993-2005:
Eritrea, which was de facto independent since May 1991 from Ethiopia, was not officially 
recognized until 1993. Consequently, aid that was given to Eritrea in those first two years of 
Independence was merged with that of Ethiopia. Although one of the LDC, Eritrea’s
dependence on aid has been dropping significantly over the years especially post 2005 when 
the Eritrean government published proclamation restricting NGO activities in the country. 
The table below shows that foreign aid from OECD countries has been steadily increasing 
until the year 2005. Aid reached its peak in the year 2003 accounting around 37 of GNI in the 
country (OECD/DAC (n.d.) Retrieved October 15, 2015). After the proclamation of 2005 that 
restricted the activities of NGOs, aid flows to the country has dwindled significantly and 
most of what was coming came through UN agencies and less through bilateral cooperation.
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The below (Table 2) shows that the aid that given to Eritrea and Ethiopia, although of 
different volume, was showing a similar linear increase up the year 2002. Aid flow after 2005 
has sharply declined for Eritrea but shot up for Ethiopia. For some of EU countries, namely 
Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden the cooperation with the government of 
Eritrea has started deteriorating as early as 2002 for political reason ( ). But the sharp decline 
from 2005 onwards has to do with the proclamation restricting NGOs in the country.   
Figure 2: Aid flow to Ethiopia and Eritrea; 
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3.1. Aid Modalities of EU & Selected Countries in Europe:
3.1.1. EU-Eritrea cooperation:
EU has been the biggest multilateral donor for the Government of Eritrea. Eritrea under EU’s 
criteria, which focus on governance and institutional capacity, is not eligible for the relatively 
convenient aid system known as ‘budget support’. Hence, it is dealing with a relatively rigid 
aid system known as ‘program support’. This gives EU direct control in the program from the 
formation to execution including contracting, procurement and payments. As it requires the 
projects to be conducted as per EU’s modality known as ‘practical guide’ (PRAG) it usually 
clashes with Eritrea’s project implementing modalities. Consequently it causes delays in 
disbursement and implementation of the projects. EU’s mid-term reviews (from 8-10th EDF) 
attribute these delays and poor disbursement to Eritrea’s deficiency in technical capability
and experts. Shortage in technical experts and weak institutions is something Eritrea cannot 
deny. At the same time the procedures Eritrea is required to follow in perusing projects are 
burdensome, and at times at odds with the domestic rules.
The major development program so far accomplished or underway of implementation 
through EU assistance to Eritrea are: one, post-war rehabilitation program (7th EDF); two, 
support to displaced people and demobilization of military personnel (8th EDF); three, 
education and infrastructure (9th EDF); and four, food security, legal and public service (10th 
EDF) (European Commission, 2002 & 2009). In principle the CSPs and National Indicative 
Program (NIP) that brought the above projects are prepared by the government of Eritrea. 
However, as any program cannot be guaranteed fund unless designed along the general 
priorities set in CPA and endorsed by EU, it doesn’t necessarily mean they reflect the 
priorities of Eritrea’s government. Hence, Eritrea’s terminations of the road maintenance 
project from the 9th and 10th EDF and later the whole package of 10th EDF (though restored 
through negotiation) attribute to the question of ownership of the program. 
EU’s stand to elevate NSA’s and particularly NGO’s role in the formulation and 
implementation of program is also amongst the contentious areas in the partnership. Eritrea’s 
choice of independent line, full ownership of its development policies and activities, and the 
continuous endeavor to graduate from aid challenged EU’s mechanism of channeling
development assistance through NGOs. The successive government’s proclamations and 
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policy reformations in the endeavor to graduate from humanitarian assistance and to advance 
the notion of developmental state have reduced the number of foreign NGOs in the country. 
This gradually limited European Commission Humanitarian Organization’s (ECHO) 
counterparts in the country and widened the policy rift of EU and Eritrea in that regard (EC, 
2009). Despite the difference in approach between the two counter parts, engagement still 
continues and the EU remains one of the biggest partners of Eritrea. This could be considered 
a win to Eritrean government because it did not give in too much in terms of country 
ownership of assistance. 
3.2.1. Denmark, Netherlands, Norway & Sweden:
Eritrea formulated its aid policy shortly after its independence. The policy was powerfully
articulated in aid negotiations. The policy reflected the countries desire for long-term reliable
programs, while targeting “quick graduation” by gradual phasing out of assistance. Denmark 
was the most willing to supporting Eritrea’s development goal. Consequently, sector program 
agreements were developed in agriculture and education. The program was long-term 
commitment spanning for13 years portioned into three phases (three years, five years, five 
years) (Anneke et al.2008), with the last phase being agreed as a “phase out”. 
Unfortunately for the government of Eritrea, Denmark decided to pull out its support to the 
agriculture sector in 2002, despite the ASSP having been described a success stories of 
Denmark’s sector support program partnerships. No arrangement was made for phasing out, 
leaving the agricultural sector in Eritrea with a 40 percent deficit in budget and without
alternatives funding (Anneke et al.2008).
Table 2. Aid modalities of selected countries:
Denmark Netherlands Norway Sweden
Political ties Closed 2002 Closed in 2007 closed Liaison office
Trends in 
aid volume
Rapid increase 
until dramatic fall 
in 2002
Rapid increase until 
dramatic fall in 
disbursement in 2002
Reduced during 
war with Ethiopia 
and again 
increased after 
2002
Ups and down 
1995/6 and 
2002
Main 
sectors 
Agriculture, 
Education
Governance, 
agriculture, Education, 
fisheries
Governance, 
humanitarian
Energy, 
education 
research 
Aid Project and Project support Project support Project support
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modalities program support
Non aid 
relations
Total 
disengagement
Retained embassy 
until 2007
Total 
disengagement 
Embassy open 
but 
ambassador in 
Stockholm
Danish cooperation from 1993 to 2002 with Eritrea was considered “ideal” by GoSE and a
case of a “true partnership” (Ibid). In its support of agricultural sector, Denmark provided a 
kind of “mini” budget support which is way advanced means of support compared to the 
normal program support other donors gave to Eritrea (Anneke et al.2008). The support to the 
education sector (1996–2005) was no different with the Ministry of Education (MoE) being
mostly responsible for program execution, and with almost no interference from foreign 
advisors.
Denmark’s exit from Eritrea in 2002 was clearly political. Denmark mentioned lack of
“democratization” and “economic liberalization” as the primary reasons for ending the 
partnership. Nevertheless, the cooperation was thought to satisfactory (Ibid).
Netherland and Eritrea partnership was project support and less developed compared to the 
budgetary support of Denmark. Netherland began assisting Eritrea in the Agriculture, 
Education, Fisheries, and governance sectors as early as 1993 and the engagement showed 
progress until it was suddenly downsized in 2002.
Norway’s engagement with Eritrea was no different. It started in 1993 as a project support in 
Governance and humanitarian assistance. The engagement continued until 2002 although it 
was reduced during the war with Ethiopia between 1998 -2000. Like that of Denmark and 
Netherlands, Norway’s exit from Eritrea was also for political reasons. In my interviews with 
officials of the Ministry of National Planning and Development, Denmark, Netherland, 
Norway and Sweden scaled down or stopped their support to the Eritrean government after 
the expulsion by the Eritrean government of Italian Ambassador in October 2001.
Sweden and Eritrea cooperation has seen ups and down in 1995/6 for disagreement regarding 
asylum issues of Eritreans. But it continued nonetheless until 2002 when as a project support 
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in Education and Energy. In the year 2001, disagreement began to show when Eritrean 
authorities jailed an Eritrean-Swedish journalist and engagement was sharply scaled down in 
2002. Unlike the other three, Sweden still maintained a liaison office but bilateral cooperation 
is almost nonexistent.    
CHAPTER FOUR
AID FLOWS AFTER 2005:
The year 2005 was a turning point in terms of Eritrean relations to the donors. After the 
proclamation 145/2005 that severely restricted the activities of NGOs in the country, many 
NGOs including USAID had left. Relations with most European countries were strained and 
Eritrea voiced concerns since 2009 over the procedures of EU funded projects in the country. 
Consequently in the same year it unilaterally terminated EU funded Road Maintenance 
project. In 2011 it similarly interrupted EDF 10 with its €120 million volume and asked UN 
agencies to phase-out their projects. The then Minister of Finance, Mr. Berhane Abrehe’s, 
official letter to UNDP in January 2011 said: “aid only postpones the basic solution of the 
crucial development by tentatively ameliorating their manifestations without tackling their 
root causes. The structural, political, economic etc. damage that it inflicts upon recipient 
countries is also enormous” (Ministry of Finance, 2011). Nonetheless, both EU and UNDP 
activities returned to normalcy after both sides agreed with the government of Eritrea to 
streamline their activity with the government’s development plan in 2012.
The other characteristics of post 2005 cooperation was that most European countries stopped 
cooperating directly with the Eritrean government but rather opted to work through the EU or 
through third part like UNICEF and UNDP. The assistance given to Eritrea after 2005 did not 
fundamentally change its modality-project support and most of went the Education and 
Health sectors. Between 2014-2015, 43% of assistance went to the Education Sector and 
about 10% went to health, while only 3% went to the production sector. (OECD - DAC: 
htp://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-data/aid-at-a-
glance.htm). Eritrea’s achievement in some of the MDGs, especially in health and education 
sectors shows that the country can make a good use of assistance if let set the priorities and 
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have full control over the project implementations. 
4.1. The Paris Declaration and MDGs:
The Paris Declaration (PD) in many ways fits to the model Eritrea aspires aid should be 
delivered. Eritrea emphasizes “partnership rather than “donor–recipient” relationships. The 
PD encourages Donors and beneficiaries to cooperate on “partnerships” basis in which they 
have distinct roles as well as joint responsibilities”
In the thematic meetings of MDGs which intends to tackle poverty, provide basic needs in
education and health, as well as with gender equality and environmental sustainability, the 
PD shoulders developing countries the responsibility of taking the primary role of defining 
“their own development priorities”, as well as “formulating their policies and strengthening 
their institutions”. PD further underlines popular participation in development processes of 
their countries. 
Very much in tune with the Eritrean Government’s rhetoric, PD also described aid as one 
factor to development and that it should be viewed as a facilitator rather than the main 
development input. The PD further urges donor countries to support the priorities of 
beneficiary countries and respect their national planning and organizational, capacities.
All in all the MDGs were founded in a way countries assume central position in their policies
and this was a total policy shift from the 1980s where states were largely by-passed. In the 
PD, policy conditionalities that were the essence of the SAP gave way to “selectivity” and to 
focusing on results. For better results, it was emphasized that Partner Countries develop
strong institutions, good policies; and good governance that are supported by their own 
citizens. Avoiding corruption and maintain the rule of law and human rights was also given 
center stage.
The PD also urges donor countries to avoid national strategic interests and commercial goals 
in their cooperation with beneficiaries. To minimize the administrative burdens, and to have 
accountability, policies were urged to harmonize and aligned (Habtom, 2016). 
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This notion of country ownership and being in control of policy matters was very much in 
line with Eritrean Government’s own vision. Of the 7 MDGs, Eritrea has achieved goals 
number 3, 4 and 5 in the health sector. Eritrea has registered an exceptional achievement in 
reducing infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births from 92 in 1990 to 58 in 2000, and to 37 
in 2012 (WHO, 2014). Under-five mortality per 1,000 live births was cut from 150 in 1990 to 
89 in 2000, and to 50 in 2013 (UNICEF, 2014). MDG 4 calls for cutting under-five mortality 
by 2/3 between 1990 and 2015. The MDG-4 target for Eritrea for 2015 was 50. Eritrea has 
achieved MDG-4 two years ahead in 2013 (Ibid). 
Eritrea has learned good lessons and applied a number of strategies in realizing this landmark. 
The GoSE recognizes the participation of rural communities as an effective and economically 
affordable tool in alleviating disease and promoting primary health care. Communities have 
been educated to raise their awareness, and this resulted in “improved health-seeking 
behaviors”. Health services were also taken closer to the community (Ministry of Health 
2004). 
WHO Statistics Report of 2014 indicates that the maternal mortality ratio for Eritrea dropped
from 1,700 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 670 in 2000 and to 380 in 2013. The 2015 
target for Eritrea (425 per 100,000 live births), was met a year before the due date of 2015. Dr 
Giorgis Tesfamichael, Minister of national Development of the State of Eritrea admits that 
foreign assistance played a role in achieving some of the MDGs by saying; “The impact on 
the daily life of the people is significant and has been reflected in the achievement of certain 
millennium development goal (MDG) targets, as evidenced during a meeting in the margins 
of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014”.
Although foreign assistance was very important here, a strong Government that was able to 
mobilize people behind a goal was also important for these achievements. Public partaking
and involvement in the health service delivery helps seal the gap in skill deficiency and takes, 
services closer to the beneficiary community. Despite the achievements in health and 
education, the other MDGs especially reducing poverty did not show significant progress. 
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS:
The results from the documents referred and the interviews conducted could not lead to 
conclusive evidence as to what the Eritrean government claims of aid creating dependency or 
“crippling society”. This evidence is on the whole encouraging. The Eritrean government has 
a strong control on setting priorities and owning the whole development policies of the 
country. This is not to suggest that more cannot be done to improve the relations of the 
government with the donors. One area that can be improved is the avoidance of mixing 
political interest with aid technicalities on the side of donors. The Eritrean government also 
needs to focus more on institution capacity building so that aid is absorbed more easily. 
All my interviewees from the government side seem to display an exaggerated sense of 
skepticism about the intentions of western assistance. Another finding is that aid almost 
always falls short of the required amount and takes too much time to be delivered which 
frustrated the government of Eritrea at times. 
The trends also shows that Eritrean government grew bolder and bolder with time when 
negotiating aid cooperation and rarely seemed to compromise on the fundamental principles. 
Thus Eritrea was prepared to deal with SAPs and PRSPs requirements of the agreements with 
its own approach without compromising its developmental principles. Accordingly, Eritrea
has been implementing programs that do not compromise its developmental state aspiration 
and filter programs that don’t fit with its policy framework. 
In the last two decades the aid regime of the partnership has been the source of friction 
between the EU and Eritrea. Though EU remains to be the largest development cooperation 
partner of Eritrea, the size and focus of its aid on poverty alleviation has been questioned by 
the government of Eritrea. Throughout the last 20 years EU has committed to Eritrea €280.2 
million and disbursed €168 million in total (from 7th-10th EDF) (European Commission, 
2002, & 2009). This is €14.1 million a year while the actual disbursed amount is €8.4 million. 
It should be admitted that there were also some bilateral supports from EU member states. 
This amount has never proved to be large enough to instigate the needed “big push”.
One problem was that aid delivered was fragmented and was delivered in small slices. This is 
despite the OECD warning against “aid that comes in small slices from too many donors”.
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This is believed to create unnecessary costs (Ibid). In my interview with officials of the 
Ministry of National Planning and Development, I found out that there was lack of 
coordination among aid agencies, and rarely did they share lessons and experience.
One issue that was not a big problem for the Eritrea government was the noninvolvement or 
minimal involvement of Non-government organizations and charities. These organizations 
are said to undermine the host government’s “self-reliance” when they act on behalf of the 
host government (Habtom, 2016). 
Unlike many SSA countries, the government of Eritrea strictly instructs donors not spend 
more than 10% of the total project costs for administrative expenses. The government allows 
expense only if they inevitable and directly connected to the project itself. The other rather 
unique experience is that the number of expats be as few as possible so as to avoid additional 
expenses.
Despite the strict control and strong ownership by the Eritrean government, most donors’
decision to withdraw cooperation from Eritrea was not triggered aid related technical issues. 
Sharp scaling down started in 2001 and was mostly caused by the donors’ political view of 
Eritrea. The war with Ethiopia also reversed many of the macro-economic improvements that 
had been registered by Eritrea; creating a serious strain in the bilateral relations with the
western donors. 
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
6.1. Conclusion:
The Eritrean government came late to the International aid system and has tried its best to 
learn from the mistakes of the other fellow SSA countries and the Structural adjustment 
programs of 1970s and 1980s. When Eritrea joined EU-ACP partnership in the summit of 
Lomé IV, the aid regime of the partnership was already adjusted along the global consensus 
of donors on neoliberal terms. So if the newly independent Eritrea was to benefit from 
international aid and finance, it had to design its development program along SAPs and later 
on PRSPs principles. Furthermore it had also to accept human rights, democracy, and rule of 
law, good governance and mandatory political dialogue as components of the development 
program. Considering the lack of clear mutual understanding on the terms of human rights 
and democracy in the agreement documents, it was to be expected that problems would 
emanate or misunderstanding and misinterpreting of the texts would occur. 
Eritrea’s focus on sustainable development and social justice concur with the socio-economic 
rights enshrined in the UN Charter of Fundamental Rights of Human Beings. Accordingly it 
believes achievements in the social-economic rights could easily lead to achievements on 
political and civil rights. [(E-SMART, (2013)]. On the other hand, EU emphasis is on the 
political and civil rights. Although these two philosophies are not fundamentally conflicting, 
the priority given to them and the argument of which comes first was different for either side
and it proved to be a source of disagreement at times.  
Moreover, EU’s emphasis on aid as a poverty alleviating mechanism both in Lomé IV and 
CPA does not always coincide with Eritrea’s view of development. For Eritrea, as expressed 
in the National Charter, Macro-economic Policy and Constitution, foreign assistance is not a 
development mechanism but an addition to the national effort, particularly in times of gap 
and crisis. According to the above mentioned policy documents and my interviews account 
industrialization and trade is the main mechanisms of poverty reduction and decisive factors 
for development in the Eritrean vision. Thus, EU’s presentation to aid as a development 
mechanism and as the much needed “big push” model is more political and at the same time 
prone to corrupting recipient countries according to Eritrean government’s view. The Eritrean 
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government believes that domestic resources mobilization is the only way forward if 
economic emancipation is to materialize. 
Another important conclusion from this research is that aid is a “drop in the ocean” compared 
to the resource needed for making a major push to economic development. There are so many 
non-aid factors that affect these broad results, like international food and energy prices, 
commodity prices, world interest rates, trade wars between big economies and the like.
Therefore, trying to detect the effect of aid becomes very hard. The Eritrean case is no 
different here. The results of aid effectiveness are mixed. Eritrean government’s
characterization of aid as ‘crippling” can be considered an exaggeration especially 
considering the country’s achievements in some of the MDGs.   
Eritrea can be considered one of the overachievers when it comes to the MDGs. It has 
achieved three of the MDG goals in the health sector. Foreign Aid has played a big role here,
and this shows that Eritrea can make use of foreign assistance if the country could sort out its 
difference with the Western donors. It is true that aid cannot bear the weight of responsibility 
which many people would like to shoulder it. It is only one input into the development 
process. After all, it is only resource that many poor countries would need to fund projects. 
Taking aid to a particular country, it may be that some or all of it displaces domestic 
resources which would otherwise have been tapped - for example by higher taxation. In that 
case aid is effectively financing consumption. 
In my interviews with the Eritrean government officials, mobilizing domestic resources was 
not believed to have hindered because of aid replacing it but rather because of war with 
Ethiopia and he subsequent “no war, no peace” situation that ensued after the war for almost 
20 years. Although it is evident that aid was too little to get Eritrea out of poverty especially 
after its economy was devastated during the 30 years liberation struggle against Ethiopia and 
another two years border war with the same giant neighbor, there is no conclusive evidence 
that aid actually hampered development or weakened the country’s ownership of its 
development course. On the contrary aid has played a positive role and would have played 
even greater role had it not been politicized by both the Eritrean government and the donors. 
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6.2. Recommendations:
 Although Eritrea has showed comparatively strong ownership of the aid process and 
was considered one of the least corrupt in SSA countries ( ), aid has not always 
brought the intended results mainly because of weak institution and lack of absorbing 
capacity. The GoSE needs to work diligently to strengthen its institutions so as to 
adequately take advantage of the aid given to the country. 
 The Coordinators in the Ministry of National Planning and Development witnessed 
that coordination among different donors was not an easy task. The main reason for 
that are the differing views about aid in the country. Foreign assistance is believed to 
be less effective when it is channeled through so many institutions. Harmonization of 
donors needs to be worked out in the future for better results.
 According to my interviews, countries of Asia such as China, Thailand, and Japan to a 
relative degree seemed to be more engaging with the government, and have more 
flexible approaches compared to most of OECD countries. To minimize these gaps in 
approaches and to better harmonize policies, it is essential to put in place a platform
where donors can work towards common goals.
 Another Important lessons learnt by the GoSE are the necessity of having a binding 
agreements. Moreover, it is important to comprise more than one donor in the bigger
sector programs because that helps sharing the risks. It is importatnt to device better 
communication strategy with donors who planning to exit, especially when thy exit 
suddenly. That can help finding a smooth and less harmful ways of exiting. 
 Lastly, a key concern with the GoSE is that donor exits should be mainly based on 
development merits and not political calculations. It was evident that Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden’s exit decision from Eritrea was more about 
political decisions and less about aid related considerations. 
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